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I. Introduction
Unprecedented in ambition, uneven in experience, controversial
from the outset, and facing serious challenges in the years ahead,
the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), launched in 1973, remains one of
the most significant and debatable developments in postwar U.S. se-
curity policy. Never before had the United States attempted to
maintain so large a standing force composed entirely of volunteers.I
Few other nations rely wholly on volunteers for their military forces,
and indeed none relies on volunteers on anything near the scale of
the AVF.
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For some people, the answers to force composition questions de-
pend more on political philosophy than on considerations of the na-
tion's role in the world and the nature of external threats. What size
armed force, drawn from which of the citizenry, how compensated
and controlled, and whether drafted or exclusively volunteer, are
enduring questions in the politics of American defense.3 The de-
bate over the AVF is so difficult precisely because its terms cannot
be separated from broader questions of domestic values.
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1. Before the creation of the AVF in 1973, the largest armed force the United States
had assembled in peacetime without a draft was in 1947-48, when active forces totalled
1,384,500. By contrast, the modern AVF was intended to field an active force of be-
tween two and three million.
2. Among U.S. allies, Britain fields an all-volunteer force of approximately 326,000;
Japan, a volunteer force of 245,000; Canada, 83,000; Australia, 72,000; and New Zea-
land, 13,000. INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BALANCE: 1984-1985, at
32, 101, 35, 96, 106 (1984). All of the Warsaw Pact countries have conscripted forces, as
do most other military powers. Id. at 17, 23-28.
3. For a review of the history of military manpower procurement in the United
States, see Lacy, Military Vanpower: The Anmerican Experience and the Endnring Debate, in
TOWARD A CONSENSUS ON MILITARY SERVICE: REPORT OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL'S
WORKING GROUP ON MILITARY SERVICE 20-51 (A. Goodpaster, L. Elliott &J. Hovey, Jr.
eds. 1982) [hereinafter TOWARD A CONSENSUS ON MILITARY SERVICE] and Eitelberg &
Binkin, .ilitarv Service in American Societv, in id., at 235-42.
4. Among other things, military service "pit[s] against one another traditional values
of citizen obligation and individual freedom, and competing concepts of citizen-soldiers
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The debate is also about the military effectiveness of the AVF,
however, and thus speaks fairly directly to external security goals as
well. Manpower procurement choices are closely linked to ques-
tions of how many and what kinds of military forces will be available
and necessary for national security. It is on these security dimen-
sions of the AVF that I will focus here.
Few subjects, it should be noted, have been studied or argued
about as extensively as has the AVF in recent years. 5 Although inter-
pretations differ, present facts are not greatly in dispute. Such well-
covered ground is only briefly revisited here. My aim in these pages
is to take the military dimensions of AVF manpower procurement
policy beyond current facts and fashions to a not-too-distant future,
to weigh the security implications of present courses for that future,
and to consider the policy choices that will arise. Present courses
are set in any case, and will not be changed in the next couple of
years. The current administration is resolutely confident about the
correctness of its defense manpower policies. 6 Challenges to these
policies are few and far between.
7
The focus must instead be on the early 1990s, when a new genera-
tion of political leadership will be in office and when the objective
situation of the AVF will have taken a new, more problematic turn.
and professional armies." As such, it is a political issue as much as a military concern.
Eitelberg & Binkin, supra note 3, at 236. For excellent examinations of the Janus-like
nature of military manpower procurement policy, and of the influence of domestic con-
siderations on what might otherwise seem to be matters primarily concerning national
security, see S. HUNTINGTON, THE COMMON DEFENSE: STRATEGIC PROGRAMS IN NATIONAL
POLITICS (1961) and J. GERHARDT, THE DRAFT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ISSUES IN MILITARY
MANPOWER PROCUREMENT, 1945-1970 (1971).
5. For a recent, reasonably complete, annotated bibliography of major analyses, see
SYLLOGISTICS, INC., THE DIFFERENTIAL BUDGET COSTS OF CONSCRIPTION-BASED ALTERNA-
TIVES TO THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE, at App. D (July 23, 1986). Of course, in a strictly
technical sense, it is too early to evaluate the AVF. Only when the first all-volunteer
cohorts entering service reach retirement - a 20 to 30 year process - will the transition
to an entirely volunteer force be complete. See Brinkerhoff& Grissmer, The Reserve Forces
i an All-1wolunteer Environment, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE: RETRO-
SPECT AND PROSPECT 228, n. I (W. Bowman, R. Little & G. Sicilia eds. 1986) [hereinafter
THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE]. At this writing, members of the armed
forces with more than 13 years service would have entered during the draft era. Given
what is at stake, however, these technical considerations have not dissuaded searching
assessments.
6. Declaring that "our manpower program today is an unprecedented success," Sec-
retary of Defense Caspar Weinberger told Congress in early 1986 that "no turnaround
in these past five years has been more remarkable than the improvement in personnel
quality and retention throughout all components of the military services." There is no
need for further policy reviews, in the Administration's judgment. According to Mr.
Weinberger, "we can now focus on initiatives underway to ensure our manpower invest-
ment is well-managed." U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS,
FISCAL YEAR 1987, at 135, 44, 140 (Feb. 5, 1986) [hereinafter DoD ANN. REP. FY 87].
7. See, e.g., imfra notes 36-38.
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The choices then will involve not only judgments about how best to
supply the quantity and quality of manpower required for military
service (force-manning), but also decisions about what kind of force
structure (particularly with respect to the balance between active
and reserve forces) is best suited to link peacetime manpower pro-
curement to military strategy and external security goals. As will be
seen, decisionmakers in the 1990s will be seriously challenged on
both counts: in part, because the demographic and budgetary envi-
ronments for manning the armed forces will be less favorable; in
part, because the early 1990s will be a time to pay the piper for man-
power decisions made in the 1980s.
The challenges will emerge out of two developments. First, the
armed forces are likely to be squeezed between growing demands
for qualified recruits and a concomitant shrinkage in the available
manpower supply. Second, by the early 1990s, the nation's force
structure will be more heavily dependent on mobilizable reserves
than at any time since the initial months of the Korean War. This
new dependence, not widely understood at present, may well and
properly call into question the entire U.S. approach to strategy and
force structure. At a minimum, the growing reliance on mobiliza-
tion as opposed to forces-in-being will reopen consideration of two
recurrent sources of policy dispute that have been finessed in the
AVF period: the optimal balance between forces-in-being and
mobilizable reserves, and the adequacy of the U.S. reserve compo-
nent structure.
These developments, the circumstances that give rise to them,
and a prescription for navigating through them, are the subjects
which I address in this article. Although it is premature to compose
eulogies for the All-Volunteer Force - for reasons examined
shortly, a resumption of conscription is improbable in the time
frame under consideration - the AVF's prospects are neither as
sure nor as reassuring as current facts might suggest. Merely to in-
vest additional resources in creating financial incentives in force-
manning - the traditional prescription for shortfalls in recruitment
and retention - will accomplish little, absent a searching reexami-
nation of the force structure and a significant overhaul of the re-
serve components of that structure.
II. Background
It is useful to begin with some historical frames of reference.
Launched in 1973 after more than thirty nearly consecutive years of
Vol. 5:38, 1986
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military conscription - in the midst of an unpopular war and in the
face of a conscription system whose reform struck many as too little,
too late - the AVF was both a rejection of the past and a daring
promise for the future.8 The past in this case was a military draft
that had become increasingly selective, domestically divisive, and, in
the view of AVF proponents, an unfair tax on young men which
could no longer be rationalized on military, political, or economic
grounds. 9 The promise was that adequate pay could be substituted
for legal compulsion in order to meet the military's needs for man-
power, at tolerable additional cost, and without adversely affecting
the size, missions, readiness, or demographic composition of the
armed forces.10
Questions about strategic policy did not figure prominently in the
debate at the time. While in the 1960s it had been nearly impossible
to disentangle the domestic politics of the war in Vietnam from the
politics of the draft policy that was selecting men for the war, by the
early 1970s the connection between the two had become attenuated.
Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia had been set in mo-
tion in 1969, and would not have been affected, one way or another,
by choices about military manpower procurement policy in subse-
quent years. t t Beyond the immediate issue of Vietnam, both sides
8. With the exception of the period from March 1947 to March 1948, when the na-
tion temporarily reverted to a draft-free armed force, the draft had been a fixture of
American security policy since its emergence in 1940. For its origins, wartime terms and
postwar evolution, see Lacy, supra note 3, at 31-42.
9. The selectivity of Selective Service was one source of friction. Overabundance of
manpower supply was the problem. In the mid-1950s, about 80% of the eligible young
men were required for service in the active and reserve armed forces. By the early
1960s, the requirement had dropped to about 60%. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, AMERICA'S
VOLUNTEERS: A REPORT ON THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCES 2 (Dec. 31, 1978). By
the late 1960s, the requirement was about 30%. Lacy, supra note 3, at 39. A draft rid-
died with a mind-boggling bouquet of exemptions and deferments was another source
of controversy. In 1951, House Armed Services Committee chairman Carl Vinson de-
scribed the draft as written "almost like members of a state assembly [writing] a sales tax
before the election." Id. at 36. Still, it was conscription as a tax-in-kind imposed on
first-term service members that "never gets recorded in the budget either as revenue or
as expenditure" that troubled AVF proponents the most. See REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMM'N ON AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE 23-28 (Feb. 1970) Ihereinafter
GATES COMMISSION REPORT]. "What is of questionable morality is the discriminatory
form that this implicit tax takes; and even more, the abridgement of individual freedom
that is involved in collecting it." Id. at 27. "This is a hidden tax which persists only
because it is obscure." Id. at 28.
10. The Gates Commission, established by President Nixon to examine the feasibil-
it), of an AVF, was confident that essentially the same force produced by the draft could
be provided by the AVF. GATES COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 7-9, 131. As for
concerns about the racial composition of an AVF the Commission projected little
change compared to a drafted force. Id. at 150.
1I . Eventual elimination of the draft, "once our involvement in the Vietnam War is
behind us," had been a campaign promise of Richard Nixon in 1968. See Lacy, supra
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of the draft-AVF debate tended either to ignore or to embrace simi-
lar assumptions about how U.S. forces would be used in pursuit of
national security in the future, and to share similar expectations
about the size of these forces.
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Instead, the early debate turned almost entirely on the relative
merits of the alternative means - induction or inducement - by
which first-term military manpower should be acquired from the ci-
vilian population.' 3 Questions about force structure - specifically,
how much of the armed forces and their various parts should be
kept active, ready to use at little or no notice, and how much should
be kept at lower levels of readiness and availability in part-time and
inactive reserves - were barely addressed. The dominant questions
were whether enough young men and women would enlist in the
existing mix of active and reserve forces absent the pressures of a
draft, whether the racial composition of a wholly volunteer force
would be within broadly acceptable bounds, and whether the nation
could afford, or, more to the point, would be willing to pay for, such
a force.'
4
Thirteen years later, in the wake of a mixed experience in which
recruitment and retention shortfalls in the 1970s were followed by
considerable improvements in the early 1980s, the debate about the
AVF continues to revolve chiefly around these questions.' 5 This
may be, in part, because habits of thinking are not easily shaken; in
part, because considerations about meeting peacetime force-man-
ning goals tend naturally to dominate the agenda in peacetime. No
doubt, however, it is also due to a perceived transience in the AVF's
fortunes. A number of significant factors in the force-manning per-
formance of the past are undergoing change, suggesting that
note 3, at 42-43. The draw-down of U.S. forces, under the banner of "Vietnamization,"
was another, separate promise. Active force inventories were reduced from 3.5 million
in late 1968 to 2.3 million in 1973. See Appendix, Table 6.
12. "A decision to use the all-volunteer force will be made according to the same
criteria as the decision to use a mixed force of conscripts and volunteers because the size
and readiness of the two forces will be quite similar." GATES COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 9, at 155.
13. Only in the two World Wars, when volunteering was banned as inefficient, did
the United States come close to having a truly drafted force. In the postwar years, only a
portion of first-term service members were conscripts. Volunteers, draft-induced or
otherwise, typically made up one-third to more than one-half of the first-term ranks.
The career enlisted force and the officer corps were entirely volunteer.
14. GATES COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 11-20.
15. See, e.g.. the topic coverage in the Department of Defense-finded ten-year retro-
spective on the AVF, lnE AI.I.-VOI.UNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE. supra note 5. and
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whereas yesterday's results may be of limited relevance when con-
sidering tomorrow, yesterday's questions will remain pertinent.
Demographic developments (low birthrates in the 1960s and 1970s)
will reduce the supply of qualified manpower for military service in
the next ten years, at a time when the military demand is likely to
increase, and when political and budgetary pressures on defense
expenditures will make overcoming these supply-and-demand
problems more difficult and less palatable. 16 Were this coming
squeeze all that is involved, its consideration might be postponed on
grounds that little can be done about it until it is closer at hand and
its extent is more precisely known. But the recently overlooked
matters of force structure, the other important frame of reference,
intervene to complicate the situation.
Less well understood than the substitution of volunteers for the
earlier mix of conscripts and volunteers is the AVF's companion
"Total Force Policy" - the substitution of reserve manpower for
active duty manpower to carry out basic missions and tasks. While
the architects of the AVF had relatively little to say about the balance
between forces-in-being and reserves, those in charge of imple-
menting the AVF have since 1973 (and especially since 1981) stead-
ily shifted this balance towards reserves, under the "Total Force"
rubric. 17
16. While some early critics of the AVF doubted that it could ever be made to work
(see, for example, Califano, Doubts About an All-Vlolunteer Army, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 3,
1973, at 9-11), a number of contemporary analyses have tended to look at the late 1980s
and the early 1990s as the time of greatest uncertainty. See, e.g., M. BINKIN, AMERICA'S
VOLUNTEER MILITARY: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 29-42 (1984); Lacy, The Case for Con-
scription, in MILITARY SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES 195, 201-08 (B. Scowcroft ed.
1982). In large part, this is because the population of males and females of military age
has been steadily shrinking since 1979, making military recruitment much more difficult
in the later 1980s and early 1990s.
17. As noted earlier, the Gates Commission, the principal architect and apologist for
the AVF at its creation, contemplated no change in the size or readiness of U.S. forces in
an all-volunteer framework. See supra note 12. The Commission proposed no substitu-
tions of reserve manpower for active manpower. The bulk of its discussion about re-
serve forces was taken up with questions of how to man them in the absence of a draft.
GATES COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 97-117. The only difference envisioned by
the Commission on this score was that reserve call-ups would be substituted for in-
creased draft calls for force expansion in military emergencies once the AVF was estab-
lished. In the absence of the draft, the U.S. would rely, in emergency situations, on the
reserves to "provide immediate support to active forces" and on a standby draft "which
can be put into effect promptly if circumstances require mobilization of large numbers
of men." Id. at 13. Still, the AVF and the Total Force Policy are intimately linked. The
additional costs of active duty manpower in the AVF make attractive substitutions of less
costly reservists for tasks and missions, and, absent a draft for force-bolstering in an
emergency, the AVF must turn to greater investments in reserves than is necessary with
a draft.
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This increased dependence on reserves is evident, in the first in-
stance, in the arithmetic of recent military expenditures. Not only
did the United States concentrate its defense investments in the
early 1980s chiefly on procuring hardware, foregoing all but modest
increases in military manpower to operate, support and maintain
that hardware when it fully enters service in the late 1980s and early
1990s, but it also made its manpower investments chiefly in the re-
serve components. Between fiscal years 1980 and 1987, active force
personnel strength will have been increased by 7 percent; reserve
strength, by 25 percent.' 8 If present trends continue, by 1990 over
61 percent of the available manpower in the Army, 33 percent in the
Navy, 39 percent in the Marine Corps, and 28 percent in the Air
Force will be in the nonactive, reserve forces."'
The dependence on reserves is also evident in the force structure
that is emerging. The armed forces have created more combat
forces than they can support with active personnel, turning increas-
ingly to part-time and inactive reserves to take up the slack. The
pattern is not new, but it has been accelerated in the last five years.
The Army is expanding from 24 to 28 divisions without a single ad-
dition to its active duty manpower accounts. The Navy is headed
from 479 ships in 1981 to 600 ships (including three additional car-
rier battle groups) in the 1990s with thus far limited increments in
its full-time manpower (see Appendix, Table 1). Already, over 40
percent of all U.S. Army forces needed during the first thirty days of
a European conflict will have to consist of reserves - necessitating a
rapid mobilization and deployment unparalleled in U.S. history. 20
Even in less demanding contingencies, the active forces may soon
be incapable of responding without a reserve activation. This is a
political and military consideration of potentially enormous signifi-
cance, and one that could constrain our ability to respond to emer-
gencies at all.
2 t
18. DoD ANN. REP. FY 87, supra note 6, at 136, 144.
19. Details are provided inJ. LACY, NAVAL RESERVE FORCES: TIlE HISTORICAl. EXPE-
RIENCE WITH INVOLUNTARY RECALLS 1-3 (1986) (Research Memorandum for Center for
Naval Analyses), and Morrison, IWeekend I'riors Playing Key Role as First Lile of '.S. T1ar-
lime Defense, 1986 NAT'L J., 256-58.
20. This percentage probably rises with the Army at 28 divisions. See CONGRES-
SIONAL. BUDGET OFFICE, IMPROVING THE ARMY RESERVES 3 (Nov. 1985) [hereinafter
CBO, IMPROVING THE ARMY RESERVES].
21. In recent testimony, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs pro-
vided the following assessment:
The Total Force Concept of the early 1970's is a reality in 1986, so much so that
contingency plans to counter aggression in both hemispheres cannot be cffectively
executed without committing National Guard and Reserve forces in the same time
frame as active forces. WIe have increasinglv slaked owlr national secrnrity on the abilitY to
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Furthermore, there is an important link between force-manning
and force structure in this context. As manning the active forces
becomes more difficult and costly in the years ahead, the pressures
to substitute reservists for active duty manpower probably will in-
tensify. Part-time reserve forces often cost less than full-time active
forces, and lower operating tempos in the reserves reduce operating
costs. 2 2 In theory, at least, part-time reservists should be less diffi-
cult to acquire than full-time active duty personnel. 23 Yet, given
what we know about our reserve force capabilities, there is good
reason to question whether acceptable levels of military prepared-
ness can be preserved in the trade-off of active forces for reserves,
mobilize, deploy, and employ combat ready National Guard and Reserve members and units
anywhere in the world rapidly.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Armed Services Comm.,
99th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1986) (statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs James Webb) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 1986 Reserve Forces Statement].
22. While in the aggregate, reserve forces are cheaper than active forces, the cost
savings vary by the unit, by the ratio of capital to labor within it, and by the amount of
full-time military personnel provided to the reserve unit. While members of the Se-
lected Reserve serve part-time, the Selected Reserve itself has a sizeable full-time com-
ponent in order to keep it operating. Counting guard and reserve members on active
duty, military technicians, active duty members on assignment to the reserves, and full-
time civil service support, the full-time support total is roughly 145,000. 1986 Reserve
Forces Statement, supra note 21, at 3-9. Current DoD plans would raise this to 184,000
by the end of fiscal year 1988. 3 U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
REPORT, FY 1987, FORCE READINESS REPORT 11-5 (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter FY 87 MAN-
POWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT]. The cost differences between similar active and reserve
units vary considerably depending on the type of unit. Reserve combat units that are
labor-intensive and require few full-time personnel have substantially less operating and
support costs than comparable active units. Capital-intensive reserve units, by contrast,
tend to produce less savings. A recent analysis by the Rand Corporation, for example,
reported that while National Guard mechanized infantry batallions have annual operat-
ing and support costs equal to approximately 21% of an active unit, Air National Guard
C-130E units have personnel-related costs equal to 75% of active unit personnel costs,
and equipment-related costs at 67% of comparable active unit costs. For Navy FF 1052
class frigates, the total annual cost of the reserve frigate is very close to that of the active
unit. J. SCHANK, S. BODILLY & R. PEI, UNIT COST ANALYSIS: EXECUTIVE BRIEFING 16, 14,
16-17 (Rand Corp., Mar. 1986).
23. The true character of the competition for new recruits between the active forces
and the Selected Reserves is difficult to assess. The motivations of individuals willing to
join one or the other tend to be different. There is a big difference between signing up
for three or more years of full-time military service, with probable stationing overseas,
and joining a local guard/reserve unit for weekend drills without having to surrender
current civilian employment. Still, with respect to demographic characteristics, new re-
cruits for the reserves are not dramatically different from recruits for active duty. The
typical reserve enlistee, according to a recent Rand Corporation study, is a single white
male, 18 to 20 years old, who graduated from high school and scored in the 31st to 64th
percentile on the armed forces enlistment test. 1). GRISSMER & S. KIRBY, A'r'I'RIT1ON OF
NONPRIOR SERVICE RESERVISTS IN THE ARMY NATIONAl. GUARD ANi) ARNY RESERVE 17
(Oct. 1985). lo the extent that these recruits are drawn from the same age group as
active duty recruits, the dwindling size of the age group will become a fictor.
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and whether we have fully thought through the strategic implica-
tions of the trade-off itself.
III. Manning the Peacetime Force
The confidence that many civilian and military leaders place in
existing AVF manpower policies comes as no surprise in light of the
experience of recent years. Recruitment and retention shortfalls
that troubled defense planners in the late 1970s seem to have bot-
tomed-out in 1979.24 The first half of the 1980s brought steady,
substantial, and in some respects, dramatic improvement. By sev-
eral important measures, the manpower side of the defense equa-
tion is in better condition today than at any time in over a decade.
For one thing, the services have had no difficulties meeting their
recruitment goals in recent years. This meant enlisting over
300,000 new recruits for active duty in fiscal year 1985, plus 98,000
new recruits (i.e., with no prior military service) for the organized
reserves. The quality of these recruits, as reflected in education
levels and enlistment test scores, is remarkably high. Topping a
five-year rise, 93 percent of last year's recruits enlisted for active
duty had high school diplomas (compared to 75 percent of today's
general youth population and 68 percent of the recruits in fiscal year
1980), and 93 percent scored average or above on the armed forces
enlistment test (compared to 69 percent of the general youth popu-
lation and 65 percent of 1980's recruits).
25
Retention of enlisted personnel has improved as well. First-term
reenlistment rates rose from 38 percent in 1980 to 48 percent in
1985. Senior enlisted personnel have also been more inclined to
remain. The current reenlistment rate for career enlisted personnel
is 84 percent, compared to 68 percent in 1979. The experience pro-
24. Fiscal year 1979 was by far the AVF's most difficult year. In that year, each ser-
vice failed for the first time to meet its active force recruitment goal. The Army attained
only 90% of its total "enlisted accession objective"; the Navy, 94%; the Marine Corps,
98%; and the Air Force, 98%. Retention was also problematic. The career reenlistment
rate in FY 1979, 68.2%, was the lowest in the AVIF's history. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE,
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, FISCAL YEAR 1981, at 264, 266, 269 (Jan. 29, 1980).
25. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Manpower and Persomel of the Senate Comm. on Armed
Services, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1986) (statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Force Management and Personnel Chapman B. Cox) [hereinafter 1986 Manpower Pos-
ture Statement]. A similar pattern pertains in the case of new (non-prior service) re-
cruits for the Selected Reserve forces. In fiscal 1985, 85% were high school graduates,
compared to 65% in 1980; 90% scored average or above on enlistment tests. DoD ANN.
REP,. FY 87, supra note 6, at 137-38.
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file of the force mirrors these gains. Average years of service in the
enlisted force have increased from 5.5 in 1980 to 6.04 today.
26
Moreover, after a steady annual decline in active and reserve man-
power levels in the 1970s, there has been some growth in the size of
the armed forces. Although overall manpower levels are still
smaller than in the draft era, 2.15 million men and women are now
in the active forces - 100,000 more than in 1980. The Selected
Reserve, composed of the organized units and individuals of the
reserves and the National Guard, is at a record strength of
1,088,000 (see Appendix, Table 1). If Congress approves, the De-
partment of Defense plans further modest increases in fiscal years
1987 and 1988. These would bring the combined active and Se-
lected Reserve force total to nearly 3.4 million by the end of fiscal
year 1988.27
The turnabout in the AVF's fortunes in the early 1980s can be
attributed to several factors. Congressionally-sponsored pay raises
(11.1 percent in 1981 and an average of 14.3 percent in 1982) did
much to arrest and reverse the erosion of the 1970s in military pay
scales relative to civilian wages. 2 8 Economic recession and accom-
panying increases in unemployment boosted military recruitment
and retention prospects. 2 9 An increase in educational benefits for
military personnel at a time when general student assistance was
targeted for cuts by the Reagan Administration no doubt helped.
With the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
an America generally at peace since the mid-1970s, and the infec-
26. 1986 Manpower Posture Statement, supra note 25, at 4; DoD ANN. REP. FY 87,
supra note 6, at 45, 139. In the officer corps, by contrast, the services continue to experi-
ence shortages, notably of pilots (of which the Navy has an aggregate shortfall of 1,100)
and nuclear-trained submarine and surface officers. 1986 Manpower Posture Statement,
supra note 25, at 5.
27. FY 87 MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT, supra note 22, at 11-2, 11-3. The fiscal
year 1987-88 increases are displayed in Appendix, Table 3. The new total will still be
less than that obtained before the AVF was instituted, however. See Appendix, Table 6;
see also Lacy, Obligatoy Service: The Fundamental and Secondar , Choices, in TOWARD A CON-
SENSUS ON MILITARY SERVICE, supra note 3, at 204, table 8. 1.
28. The two catch-up raises increased military pay by roughly one-third.
29. The unemployment rate for young men increased from approximately 167 in
fiscal year 1980 to about 25% in FY 1982. This was a significant factor for military
recruiting, but how significant is a matter of some debate. See Thurman, Sustaining the
.4Ul-'ohteer Force, 1983-1992: The Seconid Decade, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A
DECADE, supra note 5, at 27 1. General Thurman argued as follows:
[U]nemployment was a significant, but not the most important factor for our suc-
cess in recruiting quality. In fact, the economists' estimates of unemployment elas-
ticities vary from less than one to about two. The changes in quality and quantity of
recruits during this period can in no way be attributed solely or largely to
unemployment.
Id. at 271.
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tious patriotism of Ronald Reagan in the White House, the nation
seemed to shake off the last of its Vietnam hangover. Demographics
helped. The United States was only just beginning to descend from
a population crest at which there were more males and females of
military age than at any other time in U.S. history.3 0 At the same
time, while active duty forces were increased somewhat in overall
personnel strength (see Appendix, Table 1), the military demand
for new recruits for these forces actually decreased - from 389,000
in fiscal year 1980 to 330,000 in fiscal 1983 and 316,000 in fiscal
year 1985.
31
For some, the experience of the early 1980s has settled all essen-
tial questions. "The experiment is over," Secretary of Defense Cas-
par Weinberger told a manpower conference at the Naval Academy
in 1983. "We know now that an all-volunteer force can succeed,
and we know what it takes to make it succeed." 32 The "serious per-
sonnel deficiencies that undermined our ability to meet our defense
commitments" in the past are behind us, Mr. Weinberger told Con-
gress recently. "We now have a strong, high-quality force that not
only provides for our immediate defense, but also serves as a solid
foundation for our future defense needs." 33 In this view, past man-
ning problems were due not to any fault in the concept of a volun-
teer force, but rather to its inadequate execution. In the 1970s,
compensation for military personnel was allowed to become less
competitive at a time when unemployment rates in the civilian sec-
tor declined. The catch-up pay raises in 1981 and 1982, and the
resumption of payment of adequate bonuses, were all that was
needed to reverse the situation. "The lesson to be drawn from this
experience," according to the President's Military Manpower Task
Force in 1982, "is that the military compensation package must be
kept at competitive levels to attract and keep the kind of people the
AVF must have .... In particular," the Task Force added, "competi-
30. M. BINKIN, AMERICA'S VOLUNTEER MILITARY: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 29
(1984).
31. Compare DoD annual reports to the Congress for fiscal years 1980 (at Ill-162).
1985 (at 75), and 1987 (at 139). Higher retention levels permitted the reduction in
enlistment requirements.
32. Weinberger, The Al-Volunteer Force i, the 1980s: DoD Perspective, in TilE ALI-Voi.-
UNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE, stipra note 5, at 5. To underscore the point, Mr. Wein-
berger announced that
from today, it will not be the policy of the Department of Defense to speak about
our military as the all-volunteer armed forces. From today. that call go without
saying. Our men and women in unilorm ... are simply the armed forces, and the
finest armed forces this country has ever known.
Id.
33. DOD ANN. REP. FY 87, supra note 6, at 135.
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tiveness must be retained when civilian unemployment rates go
down and the competition for capable people intensifies."' 34
To judge by the content of the current debate, it would indeed
seem that basic questions have been put to rest. Alternatives to the
All-Volunteer Force are now rarely given much attention. Calls for
a resumption of conscription (or, at least, for planning to prepare
the way), prevalent in the late 1970s and early 1980s, have been
infrequently heard in recent years.3 5 The public is divided about
returning to a peacetime draft; experts who have studied the matter
have reached no agreement.3 6 In any case, political support for
such a step is not evident at the present time.3 7 "National service,"
which might include a form of compulsory military service as part of
a broader program with military and non-military options, enjoys
favor in some political and academic circles. But the idea of national
service is encumbered by nagging questions about costs and aims,
and a groundswell of enthusiasm for its mandatory forms is not yet
apparent.3
8
34. U.S. MILITARY MANPOWER TASK FORCE, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE STA-
TUS AND PROSPECTS OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 1-3 (Nov. 1982).
35. But see, e.g., Gold, Experts Question Future of the llolunteer Army, Washington Times,
Aug. 19, 1986. See also Kester, The Reasons to Draft, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER
A DECADE, supra note 5, at 286-315; Lacy, supra note 16.
36. The most recent and comprehensive assessment of public attitudes, a 1984 Na-
tional Opinion Research Center analysis, reported that 41.6% of adult Americans would
favor returning to a military draft. J. Davis, J. Lasby & P. Sheatsley, Americans View the
Mlilitary: Public Opinion in 1982, National Opinion Research Center Report No. 131, 23-
25 (1985). The last two prominent, independent panels to consider the issue reached
opposite conclusions. A substantial majority of the Sixtieth American Assembly of Co-
lumbia University was "of the opinion that a return to compulsory service at this time
was neither necessary nor desirable in order to correct the deficiencies in the AVF" and
that "the proper course of action at this time is to dedicate ourselves to the determined
application of remedies ... within the overall framework of a volunteer force." THE
AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, MILITARY SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES,
THE SIXTIETH AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, SEPTEMBER 17-20, 1981, REPORT, at 9, 11. Less than
a year later, a substantial majority of the 50-member Working Group on Military Service
of the Atlantic Council of the United States completed an 18-month study with a differ-
ent prescription. "Given the anticipated increase in manpower needs, the diminishing
manpower pool, and the prospect of economic recovery, it is only prudent that the na-
tion prepare now to resume a form of the draft later in the 1980s." The Atlantic Council
majority recommended that "the President should prepare the ground for seeking in-
duction authority as a supplement to voluntary enlistments. The risks of not doing so
are unacceptable." ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES, TOWARD A CONSENSUS ON
MILITARY SERVICE: REPORT OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL'S WORKING GROUP ON MILITARY
SERVICE, June 1982, at 53, 57. Minorities on both panels dissented.
37. To the extent that conscription enjoys political support, it is as a submerged
component in a broader scheme of national service. See infra note 38. While the subject
was an issue in presidential election campaigns in 1956, 1964, and 1968, it has been
notably absent from national party platforms since 1968. In this regard, see Lacy, supra
note 3, at 42-43.
38. The political appeal of "national service" falls along three lines. First, because it
would engage more young people than would a draft for military service alone, it
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It would be a great mistake, however, to believe that this optimism
about the AVF will extend much beyond immediate circumstances,
or that far-reaching judgments can now be made about the conclu-
siveness of recent experience. Within the next several years, a
number of fundamental circumstances will change. The pool of
manpower qualified and available for military service will shrink. An
improving economy could well mean more employment opportuni-
ties in the civilian sector for young men and women, at the expense
of military recruitment. Increased numerical requirements for mili-
tary manpower will ratchet upward the demand for armed forces
personnel. At the same time, strong popular and political pressures
to reduce the federal budget deficit are likely to constrain efforts to
keep pace with the military's manpower needs.
A. Demographics and Defense
The most certain development in the near term is the diminishing
supply of manpower for military service - a "demographic depres-
sion," in the apt characterization of Martin Binkin of the Brookings
Institution.39 The postwar baby boom, which produced a significant
increase in the number of eighteen-year-olds between 1964 and
1979, had been a key consideration in early calculations about the
feasibility of a draft-free armed force.40 This, however, was a tran-
sient phenomenon. Dwindling birthrates in the United States
brought the baby boom to an end in the mid-1960s. The progeny of
the new "birth-dearth" generation began to reach military age in
the early 1980s. For the next ten years, this recruitable population
promises to be less selective. Second, the option to pursue non-military as well as mili-
tary service in a national service program provides a greater degree of individual choice
for individuals subjected to it. Third, not only are the nation's military needs met; na-
tional service promises to respond to unmet needs in the civilian sector as well. Senator
Gary Hart, who is among its advocates, has suggested that "compulsory national service
may the biggest issue of the eighties." R. ROTHENBERG, THE NEOLIBERALS: CREATING
THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICS 210 (1984). Other "neoliberals" whom Rothenberg iden-
tifies as supportive of national service are Senator Bradley, former Senator Tsongas, and
Congressman Panetta. Id. Recently, a group of centrist Democrats also joined in pro-
moting the idea. The Democratic Leadership Conference issued a report calling for
exploring a program of universal national service - civilian and military - to meet
military needs and "to rekindle a sense of citizenship." Taylor, Vfilitamy Buildup Faulted
By Democratic Centrists, Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1986, at A7, col. 1. Academic and
institutional support is fairly diverse. See generallv R. DANZIG & P. SZANTON, NATIONAL
SERVICE: WHAT WOULD IT MEAN? (1986). The Danzig and Szanton volume presents the
most recent and comprehensive, and arguably the most plausible, case for national ser-
vice, but it too has difficulties in isolating aims and calculating total costs. See Lacy, supra
note 3, at 44-46 (by way of contrast); Lacy, supra note 27, at 207-11.
39. M. BINKIN, supra note 16, at 29.
40. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REFERENCE MATERIALS: DEPARTMENT OF DE-
FENSE STUDY OF THE DRAF-r (July 1966).
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will steadily shrink in size. Compared to 1981 levels, there will be
1.2 million fewer males aged eighteen to twenty-one in 1987, 1.4




The precise implications for military recruitment are a matter of
disagreement among manpower analysts. Assuming no change in
either the size of the forces, enlistment standards, or the proportion
of males to females in the ranks, and excluding that portion of the
youth population that may be expected to enter college and stay for
at least two years, Binkin has projected that the military will have to
recruit about half of the men turning age eighteen between 1984
and 1988, and 55 percent in the early 1990s - an imposing pros-
pect compared to the 42 percent of this age group required during
1981-83.42 Others are more sanguine, either because their projec-
tions lead them to different results, or because they do not regard
the impact on recruitment as especially worrisome in any case. Rob-
ert Lockman and Aline Quester of the Center for Naval Analyses,
for instance, argue that when the prime recruitment cohort is
viewed as seventeen to twenty-one-year-old males, not merely eight-
een-year-olds, the expected impacts are less severe. 43 The Congres-
sional Budget Office, for one, does not anticipate that a smaller
youth population will have much effect on military recruiting any-
way. In the CBO's reasoning, "as the population of youth falls, the
ratio of [military] recruiters to youths will rise, thus helping
recruiters contact as many people as before. ' '44 Others find solace
in a familiar construct:
A few years ago predictions of a return to peacetime conscription by
the mid-1980s were common. Many now believe that goals for mili-
tary personnel strength and quality can be achieved, provided the na-
tion maintains its commitment to keeping military compensation,
broadly construed, competitive with civilian compensation.
4 5
41. The United States is not unique in this regard. Britain, France, West Germany,
and Italy also will experience declining pools of military manpower supply. Germany
and Italy will be especially hard-pressed. According to current projections, the German
armed forces could be short of their annual manpower accession requirements by as
many as 100,000 in 1994; Italy, by nearly as many in the late 1990s. For specifics, seeJ.
LACY & R. LAIRD, PERSPECTIVES ON DEFENSE FUTURES: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN Eu-
ROPE 59-64, 76 (1986) (Research Memorandum for Center for Naval Analyses).
42. M. BINKIN, supra note 16, at 33-34.
43. Lockman & Quester, The AIF. Outlook for the Eighties and Nineties, II ARMED
FORCES & SOCIETY 169-71 (1985).
44. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, QUALITY SOLDIERS: COSTS OF MANNING THE
ACTIVE ARMY 10 n.3 (June 1986) [hereinafter CBO, QUALITY SOLDIERS].
45. Hosek, Fernandez & Grissmer, .ctizie Enlisted Supply: Prospects and Polio Options, in
THE AI.L-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE, supra note 5, at 185.
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Still, there is no question that a shrinking cohort of both males
and females will mean a more difficult recruiting environment than
the AVF has had to date.46 Even optimists, who point to the fact that
the youth population of the 1990s will be no smaller than that of the
(draft-era) early 1960s, concede that the experience will be a new
one for the AVF.
4 7
Moreover, the foregoing does not take account of likely increases
in the military's manpower demand. Currently-programmed in-
creases through fiscal year 1988 are relatively modest (see Appen-
dix, Table 3). These, however, already fall short of existing
requirements.4 8 The full manpower implications of the Reagan Ad-
ministration's defense buildup remain uncertain, but guidance from
the Secretary of Defense to the services in 1983 for preparation of
their fiscal year 1985-89 programs provides a conservative projec-
tion. The services were instructed to reach an active force strength
of 2,270,000 by 1989, about 157,000 more than in 1983. 4 9 Adding
even 157,000 to the active duty rolls would, in Binkin's analysis,
raise the average annual requirement for full-time male recruits to
390,000, or close to 60 percent of the qualified and available popu-
lation in the early 1990s. 50 No one expects a smaller requirement,
since most of the increased demand is to man platforms, weapons
and systems that already have been authorized as part of the defense
46. In 1979, the AVF's worst recruiting year, there were more 18-year-olds than at
any other time in American history. M. BINKIN, supra note 16, at 29. By 1992, there will
be 20% fewer 18-year-olds than in 1979.
47. See, e.g., Lockman & Quester, supra note 43, at 179: "Although we have historical
experience with small youth cohorts and large youthful forces, we have no experience
with them in a volunteer environment."
48. In the Navy's case, for instance, new ships are being added to the fleet every
month in pursuit of the Navy's goal of a 600-ship, 15-carrier battle group Navy. Actual
active duty manpower authorized through fiscal year 1987 is considerably lower than the
Navy considers prudent, however. In its most recent report to the Congress, the Navy
cites "three serious problems":
- The growing number of ships have been manned with fewer personnelthan
experience has shown are needed;
- Considerable manpower has been shifted from the shore establishment to meet
sea requirements to the extent that it now jeopardizes fleet support capability and is
also adversely affecting the sea/shore rotation ratio for fleet personnel; and
- The difference between the manpower requested and that authorized will result
in a future shortage of trained and experienced Active duty personnel even if the
Navy achieves its numerical Active goal.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE NAVY"s TOTAL FORCE,
FiSCAL YEAR 1987, at 104-05 (1986).
49. M. BINKIN, supra note 16, at 35, citing Halloran, Planning.Memos Stress U.S. Show of
Armed Force, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
50. M. BINKIN, supra note 16, at 35.
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build-up of the early 1980s. The only uncertainties concern how
much larger the requirement might become.
5'
There is also the question of quality. The complexity of military
tasks has steadily increased since 1945. The effects of technological
change are most evident in the shift of demand from blue-collar to
white-collar skills (see Appendix, Table 4). Present trends in arms
technology point to even faster-growing needs for skilled people to
operate and maintain sophisticated weaponry in the years ahead.
Already, there are strongly-voiced concerns that U.S. troops are
finding modern weapons too complex. The armed forces' emphasis
on increasingly sophisticated weaponry, coupled with the dwindling
supply of potential recruits, further sharpens these worries.52 Yet,
accompanying the drop in absolute numbers of potential recruits in
the next ten years is a drop in recruitable "quality." The Congres-
sional Budget Office projects that between 1985 and 1991 the sup-
ply of high-quality male recruits (high school graduates scoring
average or above on enlistment tests) will decline roughly 18 per-
cent. 53 Binkin estimates that the number of eighteen-year-old males
meeting basic enlistment standards will drop by about 10 percent
between 1985 and 1995.
54
Remedies involving substitution - women for men, civilians for
military personnel, hardware for manpower, reservists for full-time
forces - are one form of response, although, as will be seen, all
such substitutions are limited in the amount of relief they can prop-
erly and realistically provide. More expenditure for military man-
power has been the answer in the past; no doubt it will be the first-
choice remedy for manpower shortages in future years.
B. The Budgetary Dimension
Even if additional financial incentives would be sufficient to over-
come these supply-and-demand circumstances, however, there are
51. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 35.
52. See, e.g., Moore, U.S. Troops Find leapons Too Complex, Washington Post, Aug. 23,
1986, at Al, col. 1. These trends, and their implications for military manpower, are
examined at length in M. BINKIN, MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND DEFENSE MANPOWER
(1986). For contrasting views, see DePuy, Technolog, and .Mlonpower: Army Perspective:
Murray, Techtnology and .llanpower: Navy Perspective; and Roberts, Technology and .Manpowver:
Air Force Perspective, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE, supra note 5, at 122-
66. A countervailing trend that may ameliorate some of these problems with respect to
some kinds of weapons is an emphasis on "user friendly" technology that requires less
technical skill for operation, maintenance, and repair by front-line forces than was the
case with earlier generations of weapons.
53. CBO, QUALITY SOLDIERS, supra note 44, at 10.
54. M. BINKIN, supra note 52, at 79.
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reasons to question whether the requisite number of dollars will be
forthcoming. In constant dollars, direct manpower costs in the de-
fense budget have not risen appreciably since fiscal year 1981. In
fact, the manpower share of total Defense Department budget au-
thority has decreased slightly (see Appendix, Table 5).55 Despite
the dramatic catch-up raises in 1981 and 1982, the comparability of
military pay to that of civilians is slipping again. Because of a 3 per-
cent pay cap in fiscal year 1986 and 4 percent pay caps in each of the
preceding three years, military pay now lags private sector pay levels
by 8.3 percent, as measured by the Employment Cost Index.56 As
the Department of Defense points out, "recent budgets have con-
tained pay raises lower than those needed to maintain ... compara-
bility. ' '5 7 However, the post-Gramm-Rudman Congress shows little
inclination to boost military compensation by any significant
amount in the near future.
58
Two possible developments in the years ahead would compound
the military pay situation. First, if the economy steadily improves,
one would expect a fall in civilian unemployment. Were this to oc-
cur, recruitment and retention goals would be harder and more ex-
pensive to achieve.59 Second, the shrinking size of the youth cohort
should itself affect the structure of civilian pay. The large number of
55. There are, however, some accounting nuances in these figures. Up until fiscal
year 1984, retirement pay to current retirees came "off the top" of the Defense budget
as a manpower outlay. These are now paid out of general funds and the account of the
Veterans Administration. Also, before 1984, accrual accounting for future military re-
tirement was added to current Defense Department accounts. Under the new account-
ing procedures, the accrual costs of future retirement liabilities, rather than actual
current payments to retirees, appear as budget authority and outlays in the defense
budget and budget authority in the total federal budget. Accrual accounting is intended
to show the costs of future retirement in today's defense budget, so that retirement costs
will be considered in decisions made today even though the actual expenditures will not
occur for many years. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPEND-
ING AND REVENUE OrTONS, A REPORT TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE COMMrrrEES ON THE
BUDGET, Part II 74-76 (Mar. 1986) [hereinafter CBO, REDUCING THE DEFICIT].
56. DOD, ANN. REP. FY 1987, supra note 6, at 143.
57. Id. at 97.
58. See, e.g., Hale, Congressional Perspectives on Defense Manpower Issues, in THE ALL-VOL-
UNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE, supra note 5, at 230-37. The Administration's proposal
is for a 4% across-the-board pay increase for FY 1987. Members of the Subcommittee
on Defense of the Senate Appropriations Committee recently requested the General
Accounting Office to examine manpower cost savings that would be realized were con-
scription reinstituted.
59. Forecasts about the speed and stability of economic recovery, and the corre-
sponding effects on unemployment, have varied widely in recent years and among fore-
casters. The most recent economic assumptions of the Congressional Budget Office
show the annual percentage change in real GNP rising from 2.3 in 1985 to 3.2 in 1991,
and civilian unemployment rates dropping from 7.2% to 6.0% in the same period.
CBO, REDUCING THE DEFICIT, supra note 55, at 4.
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young workers in the 1970s led to a decline in those workers' wages
relative to the average wage of the whole workforce. This trend will
reverse in the next five to ten years. As the proportion of youth in
the labor market declines, their wages will tend to increase relative
to the average wage - particularly in the case of new entrants to the
labor force. 60 In such circumstances, still greater investments will
be required to keep military pay comparable to civilian wages.
Yet, barring an external crisis, Congress shows no disposition to
continue in the later 1980s and early 1990s the splurges in defense
expenditure of the early 1980s. Defense appropriations for 1986
never came close to the 5 percent real growth called for in the 1985
congressional budget resolution. In fact, final congressional action
on the fiscal year 1986 defense budget produced the first negative
growth since the Reagan Administration took office. Whereas in
1985 the Congressional Budget Office assumed continued real
growth in defense spending, CBO now assumes zero real growth in
defense appropriations for the rest of the 1980s. 6 1 Facing such
likely constraints, neither Congress nor the Administration is likely
to place active duty pay raises high on its list of priorities - espe-
cially if this means cutting, delaying, or stretching out major equip-
ment programs that already have been approved and partly
acquired .62
IV. Force Structure and Preparedness
One can, of course, carry too far concerns about the arithmetic of
force-manning. Without men, the machines of war are useless, but
not even the most pessimistic of projections envisions that the
armed forces will become so riddled with manpower shortages that
they will be useless. More important in this regard is the accompa-
nying steady transformation of force structure, because it has such a
direct effect on military preparedness.
60. Hosek, Fernandez & Grissmer, supra note 45, at 187.
61. In CBO's words, "[tihis change is made on the grounds that the deficit targets in
the Balanced Budget Act, as an expression of Congressional policy, supersede the future
defense spending levels specified in earlier budget resolutions." CBO, REDUCING THE
DEFICIT, supra note 55, at 6.
62. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 58, at 236, 241; AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, A
CONVERSATION WITH ROBERT PIRIE: THE MANPOWER PROBLEMS OF THE 1980s, at 9-10
(1981); R. Cooper, The All-Volunteer Force: Status oid Prospects of the Active Forces, in TO-
WARD A CONSENSUS ON MILITARY SERVICE, supra note 3, at 107-08. Hale points out that
the Administration generally has the lead on military pay raises; that is, Congress has
generally accepted the Administration's recommended pay raises. Hale, supra note 58,
at 24 1.
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A. The "Total Force" Structure
As envisioned by Defense Department planners, the total force to
be mobilized at the start of a major conflict consists of both the ac-
tive and the reserve forces, to be augmented in rapid course by a
patchwork of military retirees and civilians. 63 While the effective-
ness of nearly every component of this mobilization scheme can be
challenged on grounds of history and logic, it is the reserve element
that is most pivotal, because unless it performs according to plan,
the overall scheme cannot be executed. 64
The "Total Force Policy," formally embraced shortly after the
adoption of the AVF, seeks to incorporate this scheme of mobiliza-
tion into force-manning strategy. There is nothing new about the
basic principle involved. In the Department of Defense's formula-
tion, "in structuring our forces, units are placed in the Selected Re-
serve whenever feasible to maintain as small an active component
peacetime force as national security policy and our military strategy
permit." 65 The newness, by post-World War II standards, concerns
the extent to which the Total Force concept has been taken since the
advent of the AVF, especially in the last five years. We now depend
on part-time and inactive reserves to do what they have never done
before, despite historical experience with reserve utilization which is
63. Reserve forces to be mobilized consist of the organized units of the Selected
Reserve and individual reservists in the Individual Ready Reserve. See infra note 66.
Additionally, approximately 380,000 military retirees under age 60 would be recalled,
and over 260,000 additional civilians would be hired in the first 30 days after mobiliza-
tion. (These estimates are the author's, based on discussions with DoD sources. In offi-
cial DoD reports, 824,000 military retirees under age 60 and 254,000 new civilian hires
are forecasted. FY 87 MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT, supra note 22, at 11-12 to II-
14.) Also, the standby draft (for which young men are required to register in peacetime)
is supposed to deliver to the armed forces the first inductee 13 days after the commence-
ment of mobilization (M-day), and 100,000 inductees within 30 days after M-day. How-
ever, inductees become a meaningful source of mobilization manpower only after they
have received the legally required minimum of 12 weeks of military training. See, e.g.,
Dep't of Defense Authorizationsfor Approprtiationsfor Fiscal Year 1979: Hearings Before the Senate
Conm. on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2003 (1978).
64. For a critique of the overall mobilization plan, see generally Lacy, supra note 16.
65. FY 87 MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT, supra note 22, at I-1. Compare, for
instance, the War Department's statement of organizing principle in 1912:
It is the traditional policy of the United States that the military establishment in time
of peace is to be a small, regular Army and that the ultimate war force of the Nation
is to be a great Army of citizen-soldiers. This fundamental theory of military organ-
ization is sound economically and politically.
U.S. WAR DEP'T, GENERAL STAFF, REPORT ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE LAND FORCES OF
THE UNITED STATES, App. III 12 (1912). For historical treatments of military organiza-
tion, see Lacy, supra note 3, and Goldich, Historical Continuity in the US. Ailitarv Reserve
System, in TIlE GUARD AND RESERVE IN THE TOTAL FORCE: THE FIRST DECADE, 1973-1983,




scarcely reassuring, and despite the fact that the reserve force struc-
ture has been little altered in the past half-century.
B. The Reserve Components
The conversion from draft to AVF, and the accompanying em-
brace of the Total Force Policy, did not result in the development of
new kinds of reserve forces or any new organization of existing re-
serve forces.6 6 New missions and priorities have gradually been as-
signed to the reserve components, but in most respects, the reserves
have changed little since reorganizations in 1952 and 1967; their
fundamental structure has changed scarcely at all since the 1920s.
67
Selected reserve units are manned and equipped to reflect or mirror
66. In overall construct, the reserves consist of six components: the Army National
Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, and
Air Force Reserve. (The Coast Guard Reserve, a seventh component, is under the ad-
ministrative control of the Department of Transportation, and falls under the opera-
tional control of the Navy in time of war or national emergency.) While all are part of
the national reserve structure, the reserves and the Guard differ in that the reserves are
under exclusive federal control for national defense purposes, while the National Guard
components are organized by state and are under the control of state governors except
when called up by the President. Broadly speaking, the missions of the two have evolved
differently, with the Guard primarily focused on provision of direct combat forces in
support of active forces, and the reserves heavily concentrated in the provision of com-
bat support and combat service support. The command structures of the two are differ-
ent, as are statutory provisions governing their management. While guardsmen receive
federal pay for every day in uniform - even when performing a state function - Guard
units and members may not, for instance, be ordered for training outside the United
States without the consent of the governor of the state in which they are located - a
provision with mischievous potential. See infra note 75.
In addition to being associated with one of these six components, reservists are classi-
fied according to three broad categories of readiness and availability inherited from the
draft era: Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve,
largest and most important for purposes here, is further divided into three categories:
Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and Inactive National Guard (ING).
The Selected Reserve is composed chiefly of organized units (guard and reserve) whose
members drill periodically and are paid. The individual ready reservists (IRR and ING)
are not members of units and generally do not train or get paid. Rather, they are a pool
of previously trained personnel who are technically obligated to the military and liable
to individual call-up in emergencies.
The Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve have limited mobilization utility. They
consist of members who were once in military service, who do not train or get paid in
peacetime, and who can be called to active duty only by special congressional authoriza-
tion. See M. BINKIN, U.S. RESERVE FORCES: THE PROBLEM OF THE WEEKEND WARRIOR 4-5
(1974); Moxon, US Reserve Forces: The Achilles' Heel of Ihe .411-V'ollteer Force?, in TilE
GUARD AND RESERVE IN THE TOTAL. FORCE, supra note 65, at 91, 98.
67. Provisions of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and the Reserve Forces Bill
of Rights and Vitalization Act of 1967, as amended, are incorporated in various sections
of Titles 10 and 32 of the United States Code. While the two acts established current
reserve force categories, the principal pieces of architectural legislation were the Dick
Act of 1903, Pub. I.. No. 33, 32 Stat. 775 (1903), the National Defense Act of 1916, Pub.
I. No. 85, 39 Stat.. 166 (1916), and the National Defense Act of 1920. Pub. I. No. 242,
41 Stat. 759 (1920). These are summarized in R. WEIGi.FN% HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES ARMY 320-22, 335-50, 396-400 (1967). See also Goldich, supra note 65.
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active units, and are programmed to deploy and fight independently
of, alongside, or merged into the active forces, depending on the
mission. The Individual Ready Reserve does not have a force struc-
ture, and most of its members do not have specific unit assignments.
Its principal purpose is individual augmentation and casualty
replacement.
However, reliance on nonactive components has increased signifi-
cantly on two counts since the end of the draft. First, the reserves
have replaced the draft as the principal means of expanding military
forces in a national emergency. Indeed, the President can exceed
the authorized military manpower ceiling on his own authority only
by activating reserves. 68 Second, whereas in the draft era the
reserves were viewed primarily as a hedge against general war and
were expected to enter such a war at a relatively late stage, because
missions have been gradually transferred from the active forces to
the Selected Reserve, the reserves by now have long since ceased to
be merely "forces in reserve." The instinct to use the reserves in
this manner is not new, 69 but the actual change only came with the
AVF. It is evident in a recent Department of Defense summary:
We have substantially increased our reliance on Reserve Component
units for more and more complex missions. The Army relies heavily
on Reserve Component units to fill out its active divisions and to pro-
vide essential tactical support to both active and reserve combat
forces. Naval Reserve units form an integral part of the Total Force in
most mission areas of the Navy including surface combatants, carrier
air wings, maritime patrol, airlift and medical support. The Selected
Marine Corps Reserve provides a division-wing team with balanced
combat, combat support, and combat service support forces of the
same type as active force counterpart units. Air Force Reserve Com-
ponent units bear considerable responsibility for many combat and
68. The President currently has authority to recall 100,000 Selected Reservists for
up to 90 days to augment active forces, a number the Department of Defense seeks to
expand to 200,000. See FY 87 MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT, supra note 22, at 1-2,
and infra note 75.
69. Among the early advocates of a rapid-response role for the reserves was Defense
Secretary Robert McNamara. McNamara put the case succinctly in the 1960s:
In the light of the present world situation, it is essential that [the Army] reserve
forces be brought as soon as possible to a state of readiness that would permit them
to respond on very short notice to limited war situations which threaten to tax the
capacity of the active Army. Moreover, they must be so organized, trained and
equipped as to permit their rapid integration into the active Army.
Dep ' of Defense Appropriaions for Fiscal )ear 1967: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on




support missions, including tactical fighter, airlift, continental air de-
fense and aerial refueling missions.
70
The extent of this reliance has been noted earlier;7' again, by the
early 1990s nearly two-thirds of the available manpower in the
Army, and one-third in the Navy, will be reserve component person-
nel. Already, in the first thirty days of a European war, about 10
percent of all U.S. Army combat units, 60 percent of the combat
support missions (such as artillery and engineering), and nearly 60
percent of the combat service support missions (such as truck com-
panies and medical units) are programmed to come from deployed
reserves. To meet this schedule, round-out reserve units with a
NATO mission would have to be available for deployment in the
first ten days; the remainder, in the next ten to fifteen days. 72 Fur-
thermore, if the present Assistant Secretary of Defense of Reserve
Affairs is correct, few combat contingencies anywhere in the world,
even those far short of general war, can any longer be met ade-
quately, for more than a few days or weeks, without an early reserve
activation.
73
These are striking developments when one considers the patch-
work of reserve forces that is expected to cope with these responsi-
bilities. Selected Reserve training requirements - normally one
weekend per month and two weeks of summer training per year -
are essentially the same as they were in 1952; moreover, in 1952,
weapons and tactics were simpler, the reserves were not expected to
be deployed early in war and certainly were not considered to be a
leading force or to provide a timely response in crisis management,
and much of the reserves' manpower consisted of World War II vet-
erans.7 4 Selected Reserve organization remains a mind-boggling ar-
ray of separate bureaucratic compartments. In addition to an Army
70. FY 87 MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT, supra note 22, at 1-4.
71. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; supra note 21.
72. Actual deployment schedules are classified, but these figures are consistent with
Army testimony, and are employed by the Congressional Budget Office. See, e.g., Dep t of
Defense Appropriations For Fiscal Year 1985: Hearings Before the Subconmn. of the Senate Conlin.
on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (Feb. 9, 1984); CBO, IMPROVING THE ARMY
RESERVES, supra note 20, at 23.
73. See supra note 21.
74. Present-day Selected Reservists are recruited from two pools: those leaving ac-
tive duty and willing to take on Selected Reserve affiliation, and new recruits enlisted
directly from civilian life. The first, while older, already have been trained and have
active duty experience. Non-prior service Reserve recruits are, as the categorization
suggests, untrained civilians who undergo basic (and perhaps some advanced) training
before entering the Selected Reserve. As the table below shows, the ratios of these
prior-service and non-prior service entrants to the Selected Reserve have not changed
significantly in recent years.
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Reserve and an Air Force Reserve, the nation fields fifty Army and
Air National Guards, each organized by state (although in principle
subsumed in the national military structure) and each still subject to
considerable state influence, even when performing purely federal
training roles. 75 In internal organization, Selected Reserve units
tend primarily to mirror active units, and to respond to the active
units' actual expected needs in terms of manpower and skills only
incidentally. 76 The Individual Ready Reserve may best be described
as a telephone directory of people who have been in active or Se-
lected Reserve service and who are still liable to call-up in emer-
gency. A cohesive and credible force it is not.77
SELECTED RESERVE ENLISTMENTS
(Non-Prior/Prior Service in Thousands)"
Actual Programmed
FY 1980 FY 1985 FY 1986 FY 1987
Army National Guard 50/47 39/44 48/45 51/45
Army Reserve 26/34 29/46 31/46 31/47
Naval Reserve 3/25 12/20 11/23 12/28
Marine Corps Reserve 5/4 9/6 9/6 8/6
Air National Guard 7/10 5/10 5/9 7/10
Air Force Reserve 3/10 3/10 4/10 4/11
TOTAL 94/128 98/135 108/139 113/147
Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
Source: DoD ANN. REP. FY 87, supra note 6, at 147.
75. Congress has provided only two statutory authorities for ordering members or
units of the Army and Air National Guard to active duty for the purpose of training. 10
U.S.C. §§ 672(b), 672(d) (1982). Both condition the order to active duty on the "con-
sent of the governor of the State or Territory ... as the case may be." All other statu-
tory authorities governing the call of the National Guard to active duty pertain to a
declaration of war or national emergency by Congress, a declaration of national emer-
gency by the President, or the President's 100,000 call-up authority to augment the ac-
tive forces for an operational mission. 1986 RESERVE FORCES STATEMENT, supra note 21,
at 11-12. Political difficulties arise when a governor withholds consent. In January
1985, for example, the governor of California refused to permit 450 unit members of
the California National Guard to participate in a training exercise in Honduras. InJanu-
ary 1986, the Governor of Maine refused to permit members of the Maine National
Guard to participate in a road building exercise in Honduras and a training exercise in
Panama. Id. at 14-15. Proposals have been offered occasionally to merge the guard and
reserve forces, but with spectacular lack of success. See M. BINKIN, supra note 66 at 36-
37. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara offered one such proposal in 1965. Proposal
to Realine the Army 'ational Guard and the Army Resenve Forces: Hearings Before the Prepared
Investigating Subcomm. of the Senate Armed Services Comm., 89th Cong., I st Sess. 4-8 (1965).
An amendment to the Fiscal Year 1974 Department of Defense Appropriations Atithori-
zation Act required a study of possible consolidation of the Air Force reserve compo-
nents. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, A REPORT ON THE MERGER OF THE AIR FORCE RESERVE
AND AIR NATIONAl. GUARD (Jan. 1975).
76. Throughout the postwar period, the primary need in emergencies has been for
individual reservists to serve as fillers, augmentees, and casualty replacements, not for
whole reserve units. See Lacy, supra note 3, at 37-39.
77. This has been the case throughout the AVF period. Recently, however, Con-
grcss approved funds for a one-day peacetime callup of about 70% of the IRR in order
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These developments are all the more striking when our past expe-
rience with actually calling up and using reserve forces is consid-
ered. This experience is unsettlingly sparse. Apart from the early
months of the Korean War, U.S. reservists have been called into ac-
tion on only five occasions: the Berlin crisis (1961); the Cuban mis-
sile crisis (1962); the Pueblo affair (1968); the limited Vietnam
build-up (1968); and the New York City area postal strike (1970).78
Indeed, since the advent of the Total Force Policy, with its emphasis
on reserve forces to provide immediate support to active forces in
times of crisis, there have been no involuntary activations of reserve
forces.
79
In addition, even such limited experience with reserve force acti-
vations as the nation has had is not at all reassuring when weighed
against current expectations and reliances. In Korea, none of the
mobilized national guard divisions had yet been deployed one year
after the mobilization."0 In Berlin, activated Army reserve compo-
nents averaged only 68 percent of required personnel, and some
units took up to a year to achieve combat readiness. The Naval Re-
serve call-up in Berlin, while more rapid, still took four months to
execute. 8' In the Pueblo affair, the six Naval Reserve air squadrons
activated on twenty-four-hour notice were still short of equipment
and operational duties four months after the call-up, and none was
ever actually deployed overseas. Naval reserves called up in the
Vietnam build-up took four months to deploy, and then managed to
do so only by cannibalizing equipment and jerry-rigging full-time
manpower from "general Navy resources." Nearly half of the Army
reserve units activated in Vietnam were deficient in occupational
qualifications, and fully 17 percent of the activated reservists were
totally unqualified for their assigned positions.82
to update their records, including employment, marital and health status. Smith, Aon-
Drilling Reservists Face One-Day Calhtp, Army Times, Aug. 4, 1986, at 15.
78. M. BINKIN, supra note 66, at 40-41; Lacy, supra note 19, at 6-17.
79. This has not been for lack of international incidents or crises involving U.S.
forces. Between 1976 and 1984, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces alone responded to
41 incidents or crises, with the average duration of response in some geographical areas
in excess of 100 days. In each case, active naval forces were stretched, deployments
were altered and/or extended, exercises were cancelled, leaves were delayed, but no
reserves were activated. J. LAcy, supra note 19, at 19-20.
80. M. BINKIN, supra note 66, at 40. The four guard divisions were mobilized in
September 1950. The first overseas deployments (to Europe, not Korea) were in No-
vember 1951. The first division to reach Korea, the 40th Infantry, was deployed in De-
cember 1951.
81. M. BINKIN, supra note 66, at 40;J. lAcy, supra note 19 at 7-11.
82. M. BINKIN, supra note 66, at 40; J. LACy, supra note 19, at 7-11.
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While this experience is dated, surrogate measures of current re-
serve readiness are not inconsistent. In the case of the Army Se-
lected Reserve components, recent analyses by the Congressional
Budget Office of the Army's own "condition ratings" ("C-ratings")
of its units indicate that, on average, reserve units are much less
ready than active units to perform their missions, despite the infu-
sion of additional resources into the reserves in recent years. Ac-
cording to the CBO, "overall C-ratings for fiscal years 1982 through
1984 show that most active units were rated C-2 ("substantially
ready") or C-3 ("marginally ready"). By contrast, most reserve
units were rated C-3 or C-4 ("not ready")." 83 In the case of the
Individual Ready Reserve, not only does it remain short of its war-
time manning requirement, but in addition, the services have been
relying on it in their planning with only hazy knowledge of where
these reservists are located, what their status is, and whether they
would respond if mobilized.8
4
C. An Acceptable Risk?
The question, at bottom, is whether such a degree of reliance on
the reserves as they are currently configured presents an acceptable
risk. The civilian leadership of the Department of Defense evidently
thinks so.8 5 Others view the circumstance as an uncomfortable but
83. CBO, IMPROVING THE ARMY RESERVES, supra note 20, at 18-19. C-ratings reflect
four categories of readiness: personnel, equipment-on-hand, equipment condition, and
training. For example, to be rated C-I ("fully ready") in the personnel category, a unit
must have at least 90% of its wartime requirement, and at least 90% of these personnel
must be fully trained in the jobs to which they are assigned. Generally, a unit that falls
below 70% of its requirement for personnel or 60% for equipment must report the
lowest rating, C-4. Id. at 16-17.
84. See supra note 77. The condition of the reserves has troubled the military leader-
ship for some time, but seldom are the concerns aired in public. An exception was the
recently leaked private letter from Major General Robert E. Wagner, commander of the
Army Reserve Officers Training Corps, to his commanding officer. Commenting on the
Army reserves, Wagner questioned their size, composition, command lines and organi-
zation in a scathing appraisal. According to Wagner, reserve "forces will not be pre-
pared to go to war in synchronization with their affiliated active duty formations. The
Army is deceiving itself to state otherwise." In Wagner's blunt conclusion: "The Army
needs some answers because our service is literally choking on our reserve compo-
nents." Halloran, General Faults Army Reserves and Training, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1986, at
26, col. I.
85. See, e.g., Philbin & Gould, The Guard and Reserve." In Pursuit of FuI Integration, in
THE GUARD AND RESERVE IN THE TOTAL FORCE, supra note 65, at 43, 52, quoting state-
ment by Defense Secretary Weinberger at the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Of-
ficers in August 1982:
We can no longer consider Reserve forces as merely forces in reserve .... Instead,
they have to be an integral part of the total force, both within the United States and
within NATO. They have to be, and in fact are, a blending of the professionalism of
the full-time soldier with the professionalism of the citizen-soldier.
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inescapable fact of modern defense: with unconstrained resources
we would place our investments and reliance primarily if not wholly
on standing active forces; in the constrained environment we face,
however, we have no choice but to rely in large part on reserves.
8 6
A third view sees a virtue in the very limitations imposed in such a
situation: if reserves must be activated in order to sustain active
forces in anything more than limited contingencies, presidents will
be less inclined (and politically less able) to become involved in mili-
tary actions without extensive national debate and political consen-
sus.8 7 Others, however, cognizant of the history and present
shortcomings of reserve forces, are concerned that Total Force rhet-
oric obscures disturbing realities that go beyond the merely uncom-
fortable and the politically cautious. 8 8
At stake is a broader question of strategic policy. With remarka-
bly little public discussion, the nation has been shifting to a reliance
on mobilization as opposed to readiness. In the case of general war,
this adjustment means tacitly accepting
the risks inherent in reliance on political (as distinguished from strate-
gic or tactical) warning, predicated on the assumption that signs of a
more aggressive Soviet policy or buildup would become evident in
time to employ mobilization and reserve force assets - and that the
U.S. and its allies could muster the consensus and political will to do
SO.
8 9
In the case of other challenges and provocations, it probably means
that any sustained response will be weakened, absent a reserve call-
up - a step that has seldom been taken in the past due to concern
that calling up the reserves would be riskily (or at least prematurely)
provocative, unnecessarily arousing domestically, and too blunder-
buss in terms of the psychology and machinery that would be set in
86. See, e.g., Moxon, supra note 66, at 112.
87. Few express the view explicitly, but it is a detectable undercurrent in much of the
reasoning behind the AVF - especially given the circumstances in which the draft was
abandoned in favor of the AVF. The Gates Commission, which provided much of the
rationale for the AVF, showcased the virtue of removing force expansion from the Presi-
dent's sole discretion in discussing the standby draft: "If a consensus sufficient to in-
duce Congress to activate the draft cannot be mustered, the President would see the
depth of national division before, rather than after, committing U.S. Military power."
GATES COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 121 (emphasis in original). The historical
aversion to mobilize reservists on presidential authority alone may be similarly viewed.
See infra text accompanying note 90.
88. See, e.g., Gold, What the Reserves Can - and Can't - Do, PUBLIC INTEREST 56
(Spring 1984); Coffey, Are lHe Really Serious? A Critical Assessment of .llanpower Policies in the
Army Reserve Forces, in DEFENSE MANPOWER PLANNING, supra note 15, at 148.
89. T. Stanley, Western and Eastern Economic Constraints on Defense: The Mutual
Security Implications 5 (Atlantic Council of the United States and the International Eco-
nomic Studies Institute, Occasional Paper, 1986).
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motion.90 In both cases, strategic policy is being framed by choices
about military manpower procurement, not the other way around.
The end result is not in any case greatly reassuring.
V. The Choices Ahead
The only certain fact about the future is the advance of time.
Nonetheless, there is less uncertainty about developments over the
next several years with respect to the matters discussed above than
in many other areas of debate. Trends already are evident: as we
enter the 1990s, the AVF will be more difficult to man and harder to
rationalize as a balanced, responsive force than has been the case to
date. It will be more difficult to man not only because of demo-
graphic developments, but also because of pressures to constrain
growth in defense spending in general, and, within defense expendi-
tures, growth in manpower outlays. Even if additional compensa-
tion could suffice to overcome the less favorable recruiting
environment of the next several years, it is questionable whether the
requisite financial incentives will be forthcoming at all, let alone
forthcoming in time to preclude and correct force-manning
shortfalls. 9 ' The AVF will be more difficult to rationalize because
the gradual transformation of the force structure has yet to be ac-
companied by a supportive strategic concept, and flies in the face of
discouraging historical and present facts. The issues of force-man-
ning and force structure go hand in hand. The latter, however,
presents the larger and more serious gap in the AVF's circuitry.
A. Force-Manning
It is not likely that the United States will adopt any new or re-
newed form of conscription merely to reduce shortfalls in the quan-
tity or quality of the armed forces. The political and social costs of
any kind of draft probably would be perceived as prohibitive. Op-
90. J. LACY, supra note 19, at 18. Reluctance to call up reserve forces in response to
external provocations no doubt stems also from the experience in attempting partial
mobilizations of reserves in Berlin, Cuba, Pueblo and Vietnam. An ability (in theory, at
least) to conduct a full reserve mobilization for general war does not appear to translate
into an equal ability to effect a partial mobilization. Id.
91. In this regard, see Nelson, The Supply and Qua/ity of First-Terin Enlistees under the .411-
l'ohnteer Force, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE, supra note 5, at 49. Nel-
son's point is that, while the AVF is highly sensitive to movements in the business cycle
and to relatively small but rapid changes in the demand for recruits, the responding
mechanisms are not. In Nelson's view, "[it took two years for DoD to respond to the
last major downturn [in recruiting] partly because the problems were not recognized
immediately and partly because the DoD program budget process is simply not attuned
to react to short-term (or even medium-term) changes in recruiting programs."
Vol. 5:38, 1986
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ponents of a draft would point to the fact that the "demographic
depression" may very well itself be short-lived, with relief on the
horizon in the late 1990s, and that conscription therefore would be
too radical a remedy for so limited a period of discomfort. More-
over, conscription in any form, whether the familiar selective service
draft or part of some broadened concept of "national service,"
would be a mixed blessing. 92 Although a draft would certainly en-
sure a steady supply of first-term manpower for military service, it
probably would not reduce military manpower costs appreciably in
the short-run.93 How significant and how positive an impact a draft
would have on the qualitative dimensions of force-manning is un-
certain. 94 To the extent that a draft would reduce overall retention
(because draftees and draft-motivated volunteers would be less in-
clined than "true" volunteers to remain beyond their first term of
service), it might prove somewhat counterproductive in coping with
the military's needs for experienced specialists and technicians. 95
Conscription would, however, permit active force strengths to re-
turn to pre-AVF levels (see Appendix, Table 6), and would thereby
reduce the present high reliance on reserves.
96
Reluctance to replace the AVF with mandatory military service
nevertheless could evaporate in the face of a serious crisis or exter-
nal provocation. The political and social costs of conscription might
then be viewed as more tolerable than the costs of manpower-
92. "National service," when considered in this context, adds little directly to mili-
tary force-manning beyond what a selective military draft would contribute; however,
national service may be politically more palatable in that in most formulations it pro-
vides to individuals the option to perform non-military service in lieu of military service
if they wish. See generally R. DANZIG & P. SZAN'TON, supra note 38, at 131-69; Lacy, supra
note 27, at 207-08, 224-28.
93. Barring the unlikely case that first-term military compensation would be drasti-
cally cut with the introduction of a draft (a step that would serve only to fuel resistance
to a new draft), the best conscription could offer would be to constrain future escalations
in first-term manpower costs - a not insignificant outcome, but one with little immedi-
ate appeal to a cost-conscious Congress. Indeed, conscription could actually cost more
than the AVF, were it wed to an expansive national service program.
94. Since a draft would most likely have to be "equitable" (that is, take a representa-
tive portion of the youth population), it would probably have limited effects on recruit
quality compared to the present time. There would be more recruits from each of the
two ends of the quality distribution, as measured by enlistment test score category -
more "high quality" category I-IIs and similarly more "low quality" category IVs -
since the percentages of these persons are higher in the youth population at large than
in recent enlistment cohorts. SYLLOGISTICS, INC., supra note 5, at 1-9.
95. M. BINKIN, supra note 52, at 130. Much depends, of course, on the proportions
of draftees, draft-motivated volunteers and "true" volunteers in the first-term ranks of a
drafted force. Policy choices will have some effect on these proportions. For illustrative
alternatives, see Lacy, supra note 27, at 215-21.
96. For other values associated with conscription, see the materials cited supra in
note 36.
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deficient forces. In such circumstances, but probably only in such
circumstances, a resumption of conscription might well follow.
9 7
Barring an external catalyst, therefore, policymakers of the early
1990s will have to make do with an all-volunteer force. Spending
more on military manpower is one option, but, as the preceding dis-
cussion suggests, is not one that is likely to be popular with a deficit-
conscious Congress or to be sufficient in itself. Simply allowing the
size of the forces to steadily decline, as in the 1970s, may be inevita-
ble, but scarcely deserves to be called a policy. The preferable re-
course is to use substitutes for active military manpower, although
the gains from this are likely to be small absent a fairly radical read-
justment of political philosophy and military technology. Substitut-
ing civilians for military personnel may reduce the peacetime need
for military members, but, given limitations on the use of civilians in
activities potentially involving combat, would help little in meeting
crisis and wartime requirements. 98 Substituting hardware for man-
power, thus deploying capital-intensive instead of labor-intensive
forces, has long had an appeal, but the gains have been small in the
past; given the long lead-times in fielding new weapons, platforms,
and equipment, further gains from this substitution are not likely to
be substantial any time soon. 9 9 Using more reservists in place of
active duty personnel is, for reasons already discussed, a singularly
unattractive course. The one area where gains may be available is in
greater utilization of women in the armed forces. That there are
such additional gains to be made no one seriously doubts. Women
comprise approximately 10 percent of the force today, compared to
the 12 percent the Carter Administration had planned for in fiscal
97. It is useful in this regard to recall the fate of the first post-World War II all-
volunteer force in 1947-1948. Sagging enlistments and slipping retention would not
alone have animated the Truman Administration to call for, or the 80th Congress to
approve, a resumed draft in 1948. The fall of Czechoslovakia to the Communists in a
coup d'etat in February 1948, and the first tentative steps towards a blockade of Berlin
by the Soviets in March, were the necessary and sufficient spurs. See Lacy, supra note 3,
at 33-35.
98. Civilians currently account for one-third of all Department of Defense full-time
manpower. DoD ANN. REP. FY 87, supra note 6, at 150. The Defense Department is now
examining steps that might be taken to ensure that at least some civilians in critical
overseas positions might remain available in an emergency. Id. at 231.
99. Indeed, manning requirements for a number of new platforms have been under-
estimated, and have had to be increased with operational experience. The DD-963
Spruance-class destroyer, for instance, "experienced substantial growth in manning re-
quirements during its first five years in operation, jumping from an initial estimate of
224 enlisted sailors to a typical crew complement of 295 by 1980." M. BINKIN, Supra
note 52, at 40.
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year 1986.100 How far the nation is willing to go in this area, and
how substantial the effects on force-manning will be, are key
uncertainties.°10
B. Force Structure
The connecting thread remains the balance of active forces and
mobilizable reserves, and here there are no politically easy choices.
To continue the present drift is to shift eventually to a strategic pos-
ture that defies both history and logic. It requires that the nation
put faith in two dubious propositions: first, that a major adversary
will signal aggressive intentions unambiguously and sufficiently in
advance of hostilities for the United States to mobilize its reserve
assets; and second, that the United States and its allies will have the
political will to mobilize before hostilities commence. It also re-
quires that we stake external security on a reserve component struc-
ture that is better explained by domestic politics than by military
strategy, and that at best amounts to an unreassuring compromise
between the nineteenth century and the twentieth.
Yet to tackle in serious fashion the balance of the force structure
will require two courses of action which previous administrations
have consistently shied away from in the AVF era. The first is to
check, and in various parts of the force structure to reverse, the leak-
age from the active forces to the reserves of combat support and
combat service support missions. We are long past the time when
we could rely exclusively on active forces for all or most crisis or
wartime missions. The challenge ahead is to manipulate the balance
back to a less risky posture. This, however, probably means adding
requirements for active duty manpower at a time when providing
such manpower will be especially difficult.
The second, complementary course of action is a wholesale reex-
amination of the organization, missions, training, and funding of the
reserve apparatus of the United States. There is little doubt that,
were we able to begin afresh, even the most hallucinatory of military
plans would scarcely come close to producing the patchwork of re-
serve components we field today. Burdened with mysterious redun-
100. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE ANN. REP. TO THE CONG., FISCAL YEAR 1982, at 280;
1986 Manpower Posture Statement, supra note 25, at 6.
101. The principal limitations are current bars to employing military women in as-
signments that might expose them to combat. For an early, but still pertinent, examina-
tion of the issues involved, see M. BINKIN & S. BACH, WOMEN AND THE MILITARY (1977).
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dancies,' 0 2 heavy with undifferentiated structure, employing across-
the-board training-time requirements better suited to 1939 than to
1989, and expected to function as an expeditionary force according
to an unprecedented (and to many commentators, wholly implausi-
ble) deployment schedule - the reserves have become the single
greatest choke-point in U.S. military preparedness.
The list of areas of useful inquiry and potential benefit in reserve
reform is enormous in scope and diversity, in part because the na-
tion's reserves have escaped critical reappraisal for most of the last
fifty years, and in part because the nature of the military tasks ahead
of them are more demanding than at any other time in their history.
Any attempt to itemize here such areas could barely scratch the sur-
face. If, however, one were to list the most compelling national se-
curity issues warranting urgent, sustained, and comprehensive
treatment by the Administration and the Congress in office as of
January 20, 1989, reserve reform should be near the top of the
priorities.
To be sure, the political obstacles to any serious reexamination of
the reserve side of the Total Force are imposing. Located in some
five thousand separate communities, reserve units form part of an
"intricate and subtle political chain that laces the country, running
through village council rooms, county courthouses, and state capi-
tols to Congress and the White House ... ."103 Few have been
eager to take on that chain in the past, given its recognized clout. 104
Yet, bipartisan reappraisals have been undertaken in other politi-
cally thorny thickets, and with occasional success; perhaps a special
blue-ribbon commission could at least begin to tackle the job of re-
vising reserve force structure.
So, whither the All-Volunteer Force? The question begets a sec-
ond question, not that of whether to continue the AVF in the decade
ahead, but rather that of whether as a nation we can muster the re-
solve to make the AVF a viable tool of national security policy.
Merely continuing present policies is not possible in force-manning,
102. Why, for instance, do we require both an Army Reserve and an Army National
Guard, and why does any state, let alone 50, require an Air National Guard?
103. Derthick, Ailitia Lobby in the Missile Age: The Politics of the National Guard, in
CHANGING PATrERNS OF MILITARY POLITICS 190, 192 (S. Huntington ed. 1962).
104. In the words of one former White House staff member, "These citizen soldiers
are so solidly entrenched politically that no one in Washington dares challenge them
frontally." D. CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON: A CRUCIAL LOOK AT TODAY'S STRUGGLE
TO GOVERN IN THE NATION'S CAPITOL 41 (1964). See in these regards M. BINKIN, supra
note 66, at 24-32.
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not desirable in force structure, and of increasingly dubious effec-
tiveness in terms of military preparedness and security posture.
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Appendix
Table 1: MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTH, SELECTED
YEARS (Fiscal Years, End-Strength, In Thousands)a
FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY
Active Forces 1968 1972 1976 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Army 1,570 811 779 777 781 780 780 780 781
Navy 765 588 524 517 529 542 558 565 571
Marine Corps 307 198 192 188 191 192 194 196 198
Air Force 905 726 585 558 570 583 592 597 602
TOTAL 3,547 2,322 2,081 2,040 2,071 2,097 2,123 2,138 2,151
Selected Reserve
Army National Guard 389 388 362 367 389 408 417 434 440
Army Reserve 244 235 195 213 232 257 266 275 292
Naval Reserve 124 124 97 97 98 105 109 121 130
Marine Corps Reserve 47 41 30 36 37 40 43 41 42
Air National Guard 75 89 91 96 98 101 102 105 109
Air Force Reserve 43 48 48 60 62 64 67 70 75
TOTAL 922 925 823 869 917 975 1,005 1,046 1,088
Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
Source: U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, FISCAL YEAR
1987, at 320, table 3 (Feb. 5, 1986).
Table 2: PROJECTED U.S. POPULATION AGED EIGHTEEN
TO TWENTY-ONE BY SEX, SELECTED YEARS, 1981-95
(In Thousands)
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
Male 8,617 8,356 7,820 7,356 7,404 7,196 6,703 6,608
Female 8,401 8,143 7,621 7,165 7,197 6,983 6,495 6,387
TOTAL 17,018 16,499 15,441 14,521 14,601 14,179 13,198 12,995
Source: M. BIN'IN, AMERICA'S VOLUNTEER MILITARY: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 30
(1984).
All-Volunteer Force
Table 3: MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS:
FISCAL YEARS 1987 AND 1988





FY FY FY 1988 Compared
1987 1988 to FY 1985
2,151 2,167 2,181 2,192
1,088 1,186 1,186 1,219
+ 41
+ 131
Source: U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT, FISCAL YEAR
1987, FORCE READINESS REPORT, at HI-4, 11-7.
Table 4: DISTRIBUTION OF TRAINED MILITARY ENLISTED
PERSONNEL, BY OCCUPATIONAL AREA,











72 60 58 54
29 32 32 28
17 13 12 13
24 15 14 13
Source: M. BINKIN, MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND DEFENSE MANPOWER 6 (1986) (footnotes
omitted).
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Table 5: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET AUTHORITY
FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL, FISCAL YEARS 1981-87
(Dollars in Millions)
FY FY FY FY FY FY FY











36,909 42,875 45,688 64,866* 67,773* 67,957* 76,814*
13,840 14,986 16,155
28.5 27.0 25.8 25.1 23.6 23.5 24.7
49,844 51,496 52,752 72,762* 73,182* 70,627* 76,814*
18,026 18,315 18,663
30.1 27.7 26.2 25.5 23.9 23.6 24.7
* Includes Retired Pay Accrual.
Source: U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, FISCAL YEAR 1987, at 313,
table 1 (Feb. 5, 1986) (percentages calculated by author).
Table 6: ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL STRENGTH, SELECTED








































Includes officers and enlisted.
Programmed.
Source: Data through fiscal year 1981, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SELECTED MANPOWER
STATISTICS, FISCAL YEAR 1981, at 72-73; fiscal years 1983-86, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE,
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, FISCAL YEAR 1987, at 320; fiscal years 1987-88,
U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1987, FORCE
READINESS REPORT, at 11-4.
